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Parties under Stress:  
Using a Linkage Decay Framework to 
Analyze the Chilean Party System 
Jana Morgan and Carlos Meléndez 
Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests Chile’s party system is highly 
institutionalized. However, recent declines in participation and partisan-
ship have begun to raise questions about this veneer of stability. This 
article assesses the current state of the Chilean party system, analyzing its 
ability to provide linkage. We specify a theoretical framework for identi-
fying challenges to linkage and constraints on necessary adaptation. We 
then use this framework to evaluate linkage in the contemporary Chilean 
system, emphasizing how its representational profile has changed since 
the democratic transition. The analysis suggests the two partisan coali-
tions no longer present clear policy alternatives and programmatic repre-
sentation increasingly depends on policy responsiveness and relics of old 
ideological divides. Significant institutional constraints impede parties’ 
ability to incorporate demands from emerging social groups, and clien-
telism remains a complementary but not core linkage mechanism. This 
evidence indicates that while representation in Chile has not yet failed, 
the system contains serious vulnerabilities. 
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Representation is a pivotal element of modern democratic politics. The 
opportunity to be represented, to have voice or influence in politics, is 
the essence of democracy. Yet representation is far from even, with 
considerable variation across countries and between groups. Where rep-
resentation is effective, citizens are likely to accept the democratic pro-
cess and outcomes of political contestation. Conversely, representational 
shortcomings undermine democratic institutions and weaken regime 
legitimacy. At the extreme, crises of representation contribute to height-
ened social and political conflict, party system collapse, deinstitutionali-
zation, and regime decay (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 
2006).  
Within contemporary democracies parties are the primary agents of 
representation. Civic organizations and social movements play a role, but 
articulating broad interests and implementing effective policies are not 
typically civil society’s central goals. Parties are better positioned, both as 
bridges between society and state and as agents operating within the 
state, to give systematic voice to citizens’ concerns (Przeworski et al. 
1995). Thus, understanding the nature and quality of representation 
requires careful analysis of parties and the system in which they interact.  
Scholars of Latin American politics have dedicated considerable at-
tention to the recent surge of failed representation, decaying parties, and 
collapsing party systems across the region (e.g. Mainwaring, Bejarano, 
and Pizarro Leongómez 2006; Morgan 2011). Amid this maelstrom, the 
Chilean party system – reestablished during the democratic transition 
nearly three decades ago – has been lauded as an example of not just 
survival but success. Chile’s highly institutionalized party system features 
parties that offer meaningful programmatic options to voters and repre-
sent broad swaths of society through established channels of contesta-
tion (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). However, much 
of the system’s durability and representational capacity is rooted in old 
modes of competition around the pro- and anti-authoritarian divide and 
was adapted to specific institutional incentives that characterized transi-
tion-focused politics (Siavelis 2016). With old axes of contestation losing 
relevance and institutions being replaced, the foundations of Chilean 
party competition have begun to shift, raising questions about how par-
ties and the system as a whole will confront the changing landscape. 
Moreover, the veneer of infallibility has begun to crack. Recent 
studies have pointed to vulnerabilities associated with the pervasiveness 
of clientelism and the stagnancy of party programs (Luna 2014; Bargsted 
and Somma 2016). Public opinion surveys reveal that partisan identifica-
tion eroded steadily from 25.6 percent in 2006 to 13.1 percent in 2014. 
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Chile is now among the Latin American countries exhibiting the lowest 
levels of partisanship, with identification rates comparable to Guatemala 
and significantly below those in Brazil and Peru – all of which have in-
choate party systems with weak parties (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Sánchez 2008; Tanaka 1998).2 Beyond partisanship, the legitimacy of 
elections as a mechanism for attaining representation has waned. Figure 
1 displays the percentage of the voting-age population that participated 
in Chile’s last six presidential elections. For comparison, the Figure also 
displays the same statistic for Venezuela for 1973–1998, spanning the six 
elections up to and including the system’s collapse in 1998. The compa-
rable trajectory between participation in contemporary Chile and precol-
lapse Venezuela is striking, with both experiencing significant drops in 
turnout.3 Parallelism in these trends suggests that declining political en-
gagement in Chile should be taken seriously as a potential portent of 
deeper issues.  
The comparison with Venezuela hints that declining participation 
may reflect worrying trends for the party system. In this paper we are 
interested in understanding whether the observed shifts in party ties and 
electoral participation are symptoms of a broader process of party sys-
tem decay in Chile or whether they are more benign, reflecting the matu-
ration of ordinary patterns of partisan competition in an established 
democracy. To evaluate its underlying stability or vulnerability, we assess 
how the Chilean system is currently fulfilling its fundamental role of 
linking society to the state, and we delineate potential challenges to link-
age maintenance. Representational shortcomings may provoke party 
decay and even system collapse (Morgan 2011; Panebianco 1988). Thus, 
by analyzing linkage here, we are able to illuminate the fundamental 
features of party politics in contemporary Chile and identify threats that 
may destabilize the system.  
  
                                                 
2  Data from the AmericasBarometer. 
3  Both countries implemented electoral reforms that altered rules governing 
compulsory voting, making the institutional dynamics comparable across the 
two cases. Chile eliminated compulsory voting in 2012, and Venezuela removed 
all sanctions associated with nonvoting before the 1993 elections. Research 
suggests these sorts of changes in voting requirements typically result in a five-
point decline in turnout (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004). Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that the dramatic escalations in abstention observed in Chile and Ven-
ezuela can be attributed exclusively to these reforms.  
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Figure 1. Electoral Participation in Chile and Venezuela 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculation based on data from Auditoria de la Democracia (Chile) 
and International Idea (Venezuela). 
Linkage and Party System Decay: A Theoretical 
Framework 
The literature is awash with competing normative conceptualizations of 
representation (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 2003). Here we are less con-
cerned with disentangling these varied and, at times, contradictory con-
cepts, which focus on specifying a priori ideals against which to judge 
representation. Instead, we follow previous empirical research by think-
ing about representation as a process best understood by assessing the 
varied linkage strategies that parties employ (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007).4 Emphasizing empirical linkage strategies as opposed to represen-
tational ideals facilitates identification of the kinds of linkage employed 
in the Chilean system and enables the assessment of possible vulnerabili-
ties. 
  
                                                 
4  The theoretical framework draws upon and extends earlier work developed by 
Morgan (2011). 
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Linkage Portfolios 
Linkages are the various strategies parties employ to connect society and 
state, the ways political actors and citizens exchange support and influ-
ence (Lawson 1980; Morgan 2011: 38). Parties often employ reinforcing 
linkage strategies or use different linkage mechanisms to reach distinct 
constituencies (Luna 2014). Here we focus on three major linkage types 
identified in the literature as providing something substantive or tangible 
to supporters: programmatic representation, interest incorporation, and 
clientelism.5 Programmatic linkages provide indirect, unconditional bene-
fits available to all through policy responsiveness or ideological positions. 
Clientelism offers direct, excludable benefits, which individuals or small 
groups of voters receive in exchange for their support. Incorporation, 
which may follow corporatist or pluralist logics of interest intermedia-
tion, involves integration of major politically-salient societal interests 
through group-targeted policies and benefits or identity-based appeals to 
specific sectors (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967; Morgan 2011).  
As Morgan (2011) points out, many incorporation strategies are not 
captured effectively under a dichotomous view that considers only pro-
grammatic and clientelist linkage. Incorporation tactics such as establish-
ing organizations to promote specific interests, reserving party nomina-
tions for representatives of incorporated groups, and granting certain 
sectors special access to state institutions, “achieve linkage by creating 
organizational ties or identity-based appeals that involve neither the 
policy promises associated with programmatic appeals nor the material 
exchanges associated with clientelism” (Morgan 2011: 40–41). Interparty 
interactions also shape linkage across the system. Programmatic linkage, 
for example, is often accomplished when competing parties advocate 
distinct ideological positions, providing meaningful programmatic alter-
natives (Morgan 2011: 42). Based on individual parties’ tactics and inter-
actions between parties, we can identify the particular combination of 
linkage strategies at work within a system – that is, its overall linkage 
portfolio.  
                                                 
5  We do not separately analyze charisma but instead view charisma as operating 
within a party system as a mechanism for strengthening bonds formed by policy, 
incorporation, and clientelism. However, without some substance, “charisma 
does not strengthen party ties, [and] only builds personal followings that com-
pete with party organizations” (Morgan 2011: 41, fn. 4). Therefore, we view 
party-based charisma as auxiliary to other forms of linkage and extraparty cha-
risma as competing with party-based ties.  
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Theorizing the Vulnerabilities of Linkage 
Knowing a system’s linkage portfolio enables one to identify its vulnera-
bilities with regard to maintaining effective representation as each strate-
gy confronts different challenges to linkage preservation. Parties and 
party systems must regularly adjust their linkage strategies in response to 
pressures from a shifting social, economic, and political context (Lawson 
1980). Most changes that party systems encounter require small adjust-
ments rather than a substantial reorientation of linkage strategy or logic. 
Occasionally, however, representational challenges demand significant 
adaptation. If unresolved, these sorts of challenges may produce the 
decay or even collapse of parties and party systems. Foundational threats 
to core linkage strategies open up gaps in linkage, creating significant 
pressure to adapt or innovate. 
While the adaptational strains facing parties and party systems have 
their origins in a changing social, economic, or political context, respons-
es to these demands are shaped by organizational features and other 
institutional patterns that facilitate or impede adaptation (Mair 1997). At 
times, constraints limit appropriate reactions or create incentives for 
party actors to pursue ineffective responses. Identifying such constraints 
highlights why successful adaptation is sometimes elusive (Kitschelt 
1994; Panebianco 1988). When significant contextual changes put pres-
sure on linkage and organizational constraints impede successful adapta-
tion, substantial linkage gaps are likely to be exposed and remain unre-
solved (Morgan 2011). When linkage deteriorates, parties must fill the 
gap using some alternative strategy or support will decay. If the represen-
tational failure is substantial and linkage decays not only within individual 
parties but across the entire system, then the party system is likely to 
collapse.6 Thus, where contextual changes pose challenges to core link-
age strategies but appropriate adaptation is not feasible, parties (or sys-
tems) will experience deteriorating linkage, which will produce decaying 
support.  
Delineating Linkage Vulnerabilities  
Identifying the particular changes that challenge linkage or the con-
straints that limit adaptation within a specific party or system depends on 
the strategies employed. If the pressures parties or systems face threaten 
their core logic(s) of linkage, then the strains are greater, and adaptation 
                                                 
6  See Morgan 2011 for elaboration of the process through which linkage decay 
infects entire systems and causes collapse. 
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is crucial (Carroll and Hannan 1995). Similarly, when necessary adapta-
tion contradicts organizational equilibria, powerful entrenched interests 
or patterns of decision making may be threatened by attempts to restruc-
ture linkage, making adaptation “risky and disruptive” (Morgan 2011: 48; 
also Kitschelt 1994). Therefore, to specify when linkage decay is likely, 
we detail the sorts of challenges that most threaten each form of linkage 
and spell out the constraints that might limit necessary adaptations. In 
our empirical analysis we apply these parameters to the Chilean party 
system’s linkage portfolio in order to identify relevant vulnerabilities in 
the system. 
Programmatic Representation 
Programmatic representation is often regarded as a normatively superior 
linkage strategy because systems that extend such appeals are more stable 
and more likely to feature parties that “look after the public interest and 
[are] responsive to public opinion” (Pitkin 1967: 224). But programmatic 
linkages are not easy to build and maintain, and a variety of factors may 
weaken programmatic representation (Kitschelt 1994). Here we identify 
the sorts of factors that threaten the maintenance of programmatic ap-
peals and specify constraints that limit effective responses to such 
threats. 
It is analytically useful to think of two mechanisms for delivering 
programmatic representation: policy responses to concerns about which 
there is widespread public consensus for government action (valence 
responsiveness) and meaningful ideological/programmatic competition 
between parties on issues that structure political debate across society 
(ideological differentiation).7 While most systems that feature program-
matic representation employ both mechanisms, programmatic linkage 
may be accomplished through one of these avenues alone. Valence re-
sponsiveness is accomplished when the governing party or coalition 
successfully addresses pressing concerns that affect most citizens – for 
example, by countering an economic downturn, combatting inflation, 
delivering public services, or ensuring public safety. Profound economic 
or social crises challenge this facet of programmatic linkage because 
crises often demand responses that go beyond ordinary policy adjust-
ments and require innovative or complicated solutions. Thus, crises that 
result from the exhaustion of established policy models are especially 
threatening because governing parties must pursue policy responses that 
fall outside their normal repertoire. The ability of governing parties to 
                                                 
7  Morgan 2011: 80. This discussion draws on Morgan 2011, especially chapter 3. 
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provide effective policy solutions in the face of these kinds of crises may 
be constrained by international or domestic actors that exercise signifi-
cant influence over policy making or by the crisis dynamics themselves 
(e.g. fiscal limitations imposed by economic crises). If constraints like 
these make viable responses ineffective, unpopular, or in conflict with 
the government’s ideology, then parties may find it difficult to sustain 
valence responsiveness, and programmatic appeals will decline, costing 
governing parties electoral support (Morgan 2011: 51–53). 
While ineffective responses to valence issues spell decay for govern-
ing parties, opposition parties may gain from dissatisfied voters shifting 
their support away from the government. Such shifts from government 
to opposition are a common dynamic in stable party systems offering 
distinct programmatic alternatives. Meaningful programmatic competi-
tion occurs when parties in the system stake out clearly differentiated 
positions on a salient axis of ideological competition. For competition to 
be meaningful, voters must find distinct options across divides that really 
matter. For it to be programmatic, these options must pertain to sub-
stantive policy differences, not just symbolic or descriptive ones. If such 
competition exists, then failures in governing responsiveness simply 
present opportunities to the opposition. However, where systems do not 
offer meaningful programmatic alternatives, failed policy responsiveness 
means the end of programmatic linkage across the whole system. We 
identify two potential paths by which once-programmatic systems may 
stop offering meaningful policy alternatives.  
The first is one of gradual deterioration. Sometimes, programmatic 
divides lose relevance. Society changes, and old axes of competition are 
no longer meaningful. Here the challenge to linkage originates in signifi-
cant shifts in the structures that frame competition, rendering old con-
flicts peripheral. In such contexts parties are “compelled to embark on 
the arduous trajectory of devising new programmatic appeals” (Kitschelt 
et al. 2010: 38–39). Because forging new axes of competition is challeng-
ing, parties encounter strong disincentives to pursue potentially risky 
adaptation, even if the old divide has lost relevance. Inertia motivating a 
lack of programmatic entrepreneurialism is especially strong during ordi-
nary times, as easy provision of policy responsiveness compensates, at 
least temporarily, for any loss of meaningful competition; this allows 
some form of programmatic linkage to persist and promotes a veneer of 
stability. In fact, the consequences of this sort of programmatic decay are 
likely hidden until governing crises expose cracks in responsiveness, 
making the loss of meaningful competition obvious but hard to rectify.  
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The second path to loss of meaningful programmatic alternatives is 
one of policy convergence. Convergence occurs when institutional in-
centives or policy-making patterns encourage parties or party leaders to 
depart from their organization’s ideological moorings and embrace posi-
tions that contradict established ideals. Blurring of programmatic distinc-
tions is especially likely when intraparty factionalism creates uncertainty 
about parties’ ideological commitments or when parties from across the 
ideological spectrum enter governing agreements, such as grand coali-
tions and pacts. These institutional patterns often emerge in the face of a 
crisis that demands action and sometimes even reflect efforts to resolve 
pressing valence concerns. However, as detailed above, such crises also 
place valence responsiveness at risk. If parties converge or create confu-
sion about their ideological positions in order to resolve a crisis and then 
fail to accomplish this goal, both forms of programmatic linkage decay 
(Morgan 2011; Roberts 2014).  
Interest Incorporation 
Parties may also incorporate major social groups to provide linkage, 
privileging their policy interests, granting them access to decision mak-
ing, and extending group-based benefits. Incorporation offers parties 
stable ties because strong bonds often develop between societal groups 
and the parties that facilitate their access and influence. But because 
incorporating linkage is built upon the structure of politically salient 
cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), shifts in social structure and the 
politicization of previously dormant identities pose challenges to this 
linkage strategy (Morgan 2011; Roberts 2003). Processes such as urbani-
zation, immigration, generational shifts, and changes in class structure 
may promote the growth or political activation of previously insignificant 
social sectors seeking access to state resources and influence over gov-
ernment policies. When faced with changes either in the structure of 
society or in the relative salience of different possible cleavages, parties 
that reflect old social patterns must adapt their strategy to integrate 
emerging interests, or group-based incorporation will only integrate the 
shrinking subset of groups linked through established modes of incorpo-
ration. 
Sometimes parties are able to adjust incorporation strategies to inte-
grate new concerns, but adaptation is not straightforward and entails 
considerable uncertainty. Parties’ organizational structures shape their 
incentives and capacity to adapt in order to extend incorporation to 
emerging or newly relevant groups. In general, we expect organizational 
flexibility to be associated with greater adaptive capacity (Levitsky 2003; 
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Coppedge 1994; Levitsky 2003). Thus, parties with highly structured 
organizations are likely to encounter significant constraints on effective 
responses to social changes.  
Moreover, we expect the nature and structure of established inter-
ests accustomed to monopolizing incorporation to shape the degree of 
organizational flexibility and adaptation required for a party to integrate 
new groups. Where the goals pursued or incorporation tactics employed 
on behalf of entrenched interests are in harmony with those of emerging 
groups, integrating new concerns requires less flexibility than in contexts 
where the aims of established interests or the mechanisms used to incor-
porate them conflict with those of new groups. If existing incorporation 
strategies do not align with the goals or organizational logics of emergent 
groups, reaching out to new interests requires innovations that demand 
investments of time, resources, and creative energy in exchange for un-
certain outcomes (Greene 2007). As a result, where old and new come 
into conflict, parties may elect to avoid risky efforts to integrate new 
interests (Carroll and Hannan 1995). In sum, parties may experience 
narrowing incorporation when shifts in the structure or salience of social 
divides are met with party organizations that lack flexibility, particularly 
when the strategies or appeals appropriate for integrating new interests 
conflict with existing mechanisms for incorporating established support-
ers. 
Clientelism 
While clientelism is frequently considered an inferior form of linkage, 
clientelist ties deliver some benefit to voters and permit basic linkage 
between people and the state (Kitschelt 2000). Party-based clientelism 
depends on parties having adequate access to resources they can ex-
change for support. With sufficient resources to satisfy demand, clien-
telism offers surprisingly stable linkage. However, when voters connect 
to the state primarily through clientelist ties, they often prioritize highly 
individual interests and have short time horizons. Therefore, if the sup-
ply of clientelist resources is inadequate to satisfy demand, people with-
draw their support and become disenchanted. Inability to deliver clien-
telist exchanges may even arouse suspicions that lost benefits are being 
siphoned off to profit someone else, raising alarms about corruption 
(Morgan forthcoming a). Given these features, clientelism is particularly 
vulnerable to supply-and-demand mismatches stemming from intensify-
ing petitions for clientelist exchanges or constraints on adequate or effi-
cient benefit distribution (Piattoni 2001).  
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Challenges to clientelist linkage are rooted in the pressure for more 
resources to be able to satisfy demand. These escalating resource pres-
sures may result from demands for an increased quantity of exchanges or 
increased costs per exchange. Several types of factors may generate in-
creased demand for clientelist resources. Social changes may heighten 
demand by either expanding the ranks of those seeking material benefits 
in exchange for their vote (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001) 
or increasing the outlay required to successfully attract support through 
clientelism (Lyne 2008). The exchanges required may escalate when pov-
erty or economic uncertainty grows, as people experiencing these condi-
tions may turn to clientelism to satisfy their immediate needs rather than 
hope for future programmatic changes that could (but will not necessari-
ly) improve their situations (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 
2001). Conversely, economic development motivates clients to require 
more expensive benefits in exchange for their support (Lyne 2008). Insti-
tutional restructuring also has the potential to generate pressure for more 
clientelist outlays. For instance, reforms that increase the number of 
separate electoral contests or that encourage a shift toward more candi-
date-centered elections may proliferate the number of separate clientelist 
benefits needed. Finally, decay in other forms of linkage could heighten 
demand for clientelism if voters try to extract some benefit from parties 
instead (Morgan 2011). 
Escalating demand for clientelism requires that parties make addi-
tional investments, otherwise they risk alienating voters. Parties that 
encounter resource constraints in the face of heightened demand are 
likely to experience deteriorating linkage capacity and potentially suffer 
accusations of corruption from clientelist-seeking voters with unmet 
demands. Constraints on clientelist resources are often imposed by eco-
nomic crises, which restrict public and private funds for clientelism 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Lyne 2008). Additionally, reforms that 
limit partisan control over state resources (e.g. professionalization of the 
bureaucracy) or undermine the efficiency of clientelist distribution (e.g. 
fiscal reforms that reduce the flow of party-controlled resources) may 
constrain parties’ abilities to satisfy demand. Similarly, reforms that im-
plement new institutions or create different organizational incentives 
may result in misspent funds or misdirected exchanges. If economic 
constraints or institutional reforms limit the quantity or efficiency of 
clientelist distribution at the same time that demand intensifies, clientelist 
capacity will decay. Among those who seek but do not receive benefits, 
“clientelism loses its acceptance because it ceases to provide widespread 
linkage between society and the state, and instead enriches a select few 
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who benefit” (Morgan 2011: 67). In the section that follows, we apply 
this linkage decay framework to assess the quality and durability of link-
age in the Chilean party system. 
Analyzing Challenges to Linkage in  
Contemporary Chile 
Since the democratic transition almost 30 years ago, the Chilean party 
system has featured a multifaceted linkage profile. This has consisted of 
programmatic appeals, which have played the most important role (Or-
tega 2003); the incorporation of major social groups, particularly capital-
ist classes, religious interests, and to a lesser extent organized labor 
(Rehrén 1995; Schneider 2004); and the limited use of clientelist appeals 
to attract support from those not captured by the dominant program-
matic model or group-based incorporation (Rehrén 1995). We discuss 
these three linkage types in turn, outlining the contours of each strategy 
in the posttransition system and detailing potential challenges confront-
ing each linkage strategy within the contemporary context.  
Diminished Programmatic Representation despite  
Continued Demand 
Scholars have frequently characterized programmatic representation in 
Chile as robust (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In 
addition to effective valence responsiveness through the provision of 
strong macroeconomic performance and effective public safety policies, 
the Chilean system has long been regarded as one of the most program-
matically structured party systems in Latin America. Within the system 
partisan competition has occurred between two coalitions, the Alianza8 
and the Nueva Mayoría (formerly the Concertación), which organize parties 
according to their positions on two largely coinciding programmatic 
divisions: a democratic–authoritarian axis and a left–right axis (see table 
1 for the composition of each alliance over time). The first of these axes 
divided the coalitions according to their views on the former authoritari-
an regime and their stances toward maintaining or unraveling the re-
gime’s institutional and cultural legacies. The Alianza had strong ties to 
the authoritarian regime and sought to protect its legacy, while the par-
                                                 
8  In 2015 former members of the Alianza (UDI and RN) and relatively new 
parties (Evopoli and Partido Regionalista Independiente) formed a new version 
of the center-right coalition, called Chile Vamos. 
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ties composing the Nueva Mayoría opposed authoritarianism (Luna 2014; 
Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). This authoritarian–democracy divide 
roughly coincides with the left–right divide: the antiauthoritarian Nueva 
Mayoría has typically been associated with a left-leaning position, sup-
porting a generous welfare state and more government involvement in 
the economy, whereas the proauthoritarian, right-leaning Alianza has 
favored a leaner welfare state and limited government. Voter behavior 
reflects the electoral relevance of these programmatic divides (Bargsted 
and Somma 2016). Here we assess the present status of and challenges to 
valence responsiveness and party system structuration in contemporary 
Chile.  
Valence policy responsiveness is accomplished when the governing 
party or coalition successfully addresses the pressing concerns affecting 
most of the population. We employ approval ratings for national admin-
istrations correlated with approval ratings for specific issues as proxies 
for incumbents’ responsiveness.  
Table 1. Left and Right Party Constellations, 1989–2013 
Year Left Coalition Others (Left) 
1989 DC, PS, PPD, PR, IC PC 
1993 DC, PS, PPD, PR PC 
1999 DC, PS, PPD, PRSD PC 
2005 DC, PS, PPD, PRSD PC, IC 
2009 DC, PS, PPD, PRSD PC, IC, MEO (Ind) 
2013 DC, PS, PPD, IC, PC MEO (PRO) 
 
Year Right Coalition Others (Right) 
1989 UDI, RN PN, SUR, UCC 
1993 UDI, RN, PN, SUR, UCC   
1999 UDI, RN   
2005 UDI, RN   
2009 UDI, RN, CP   
2013 UDI, RN   
Note:  DC = Partido Demócrata Cristiano; PS = Partido Socialista; PPD = Partido por 
la Democracia; PR = Partido Radical; IC = Partido Izquierda Cristiana; PRSD = 
Partido Radical Social Demócrata; PC=Partido Comunista; MEO = Marco En-
ríquez-Ominami; PRO = Partido Progresista; UDI = Unión Demócrata Inde-
pendiente; RN = Renovación Nacional; PN = Partido Nacional; SUR = Partido 
del Sur; UCC = Unión de Centro Centro; CP = Chile Primero. 
Based on analysis of monthly approval ratings, we identify some evi-
dence of emerging dissatisfaction with government’s valence responsive-
ness. Government approval ratings have fallen considerably over the last 
two presidential administrations: under Piñera approval was at 39 per-
cent, while under Bachelet – who left office after her first term with 
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almost 80 percent approval – approval has bottomed out at 37 percent 
(see Figure 2). Both administrations share similarly poor assessments 
despite the presidents hailing from competing coalitions, suggesting that 
Chileans’ evaluations have become increasingly critical regardless of the 
leadership’s partisan affinity.  
Figure 2. Government Approval and Economic Policy Evaluations (March 
2010–September 2015) 
 
 
Source:  GFK Adimark. 
Note:  Correlations between the two series are 0.69 under Piñera and 0.94 under 
Bachelet. There is no data for the period October 2012–January 2013. 
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Figure 3. Government Approval and Public Security Evaluations (March 
2010–September 2015) 
 
 
Source:  GFK Adimark’s nationally representative surveys. 
Note:  Correlations between the two series are 0.74 under Piñera and 0.95 under 
Bachelet. There is no data for the period October 2012–January 2013.  
To assess public perceptions of responsiveness, we consider evaluations 
of government efforts in two traditionally important arenas: the econo-
my and public safety.9 Despite comparatively strong economic perfor-
mance and low crime rates for the region, Chileans’ evaluations of the 
government’s economic policy and security efforts have deteriorated 
notably in recent years (see Figures 2 and 3). Moreover, correlations 
between assessments of government policy efforts in these arenas specif-
ically and of government performance overall have increased markedly; 
in fact, they are in near lockstep under the current Bachelet administra-
                                                 
9  According to the November 2015 CEP survey, 58 percent of respondents 
considered public safety the country’s principal problem, and five issues related 
to the economy (salaries, poverty, employment, inequality and inflation) were 
among the 10 most important problems. 
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tion.10 These patterns suggest that assessments of policy responsiveness 
in these important issue areas are deteriorating at the same time that they 
are becoming increasingly correlated with government performance 
evaluations, making the link between valence responsiveness and (low) 
incumbent legitimacy tighter and more damaging to the governing coali-
tion.  
Therefore, while objective performance on economic and public 
safety indicators remains strong by regional comparisons and not par-
ticularly poor even according to Chile’s recent legacy of favorable per-
formance, citizen perceptions of the government’s effectiveness in these 
arenas have deteriorated. If valence responsiveness is viewed as increas-
ingly inadequate in this good-performance context, maintaining this sort 
of linkage is certainly vulnerable to the challenges that would be imposed 
by a serious economic or security crisis, particularly one that threatened 
the established policy consensus or contradicted the fundamental logic 
of policy making. Moreover, because both Alianza and Nueva Mayoría 
governments have experienced these deteriorating performance evalua-
tions, citizens view the system’s dominant coalitions as falling short in 
terms of effective policy making. Thus, the decline in valence respon-
siveness has occurred at the system level rather than being isolated to a 
single party or coalition.  
Potential damage to overall programmatic representation may be 
mitigated if poor responsiveness on important issues occurs within a 
party system that maintains meaningful programmatic alternatives to 
which dissatisfied voters may turn. Since Chile’s return to democracy in 
1990, the Alianza and the Nueva Mayoría coalitions have been the domi-
nant electoral players, demonstrating a capacity to renew their alliances 
and integrate potential third-party organizations. As discussed above, 
these two coalitions have traditionally competed across two reinforcing 
axes of contestation: a democracy–authoritarian divide and a left–right 
divide.  
However, in the past decade two major changes have begun to raise 
questions about the degree to which the two competing sets of parties 
continue to offer meaningful programmatic alternatives on issues of 
importance for most voters. Moreover, this loss of programmatic differ-
entiation has occurred in a context where most Chileans seem to prefer 
ideological linkages as their mechanism for connecting to parties. From 
1995 to 2009 the percentage of the population that identified with the 
                                                 
10  Public safety and economic evaluations correlate with Bachelet’s approval 
ratings at 0.95 and 0.94 respectively, while these correlations were 0.74 and 0.69 
under Piñera.  
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left–right scale fluctuated between 82 percent and 65 percent (Bargsted 
and Somma 2016), with higher levels corresponding with national elec-
tion years. These data suggest that for the majority, the conventional 
ideological continuum is the main reference for electoral choice, empha-
sizing the crucial role this sort of representation plays in sustaining the 
Chilean system’s linkage capacity. 
However, both axes of programmatic representation have experi-
enced declining linkage capacity. First, the authoritarian–democracy 
divide has lost relevance. Time and generational replacement have re-
duced the poignancy of the old conflicts from the authoritarian period 
(Luna and Mardones 2010). Moreover, a graduated process of reform 
has dismantled many of the authoritarian regime’s institutional legacies 
while sustaining its general economic framework, effectively depoliticiz-
ing many debates that characterized this axis of competition (Lacewell, 
Madariaga, and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016). As a result, the fact that the 
Alianza is identified with the dictatorship and the Nueva Mayoría with the 
democratic opposition no longer carries much significance for policy or 
for voters, which weakens the relevance of this divide for understanding 
programmatic structuration in the system (Bargsted and Somma 2016; 
Luna and Altman 2011).  
Second, the two coalitions have experienced ideological conver-
gence on the traditional left–right axis. This process is readily apparent in 
Figure 4, which depicts the ideological placement of the coalitions’ cam-
paign platforms in the first round of every presidential election since the 
transition. The data are drawn from the Comparative Manifestos project, 
which uses text analysis to systematically code the ideological content of 
every quasi sentence in the presidential platforms. These phrase-level 
codes are then aggregated to construct the RILE index of left–right 
ideology (Budge et al. 2001).11 The Figure illustrates the emergence of an 
ideological consensus that makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
coalitions’ articulated programmatic positions. In fact, during the 2013 
presidential campaign, the Alianza platform shifted slightly to the left of 
the Concertación, reflecting the Alianza’s rhetorical emphasis on education 
reform. Without education in the index, the coalitions’ scores are nearly 
the same. Moreover, ideological convergence has occurred across nearly 
all policy areas included in the index, ranging from social policy to infra-
structure investment to views of the market. The only dimension on 
which the parties remain somewhat distinct in their public manifestos is 
                                                 
11  The codes consist of 76 policy subcategories, including the 56 traditionally used 
in analyzing western European manifestos and the 20 additional categories par-
ticular to Latin America (Lehman et al. 2015). 
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the low-salience democracy–authoritarianism divide (Lacewell, Mada-
riaga, and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016).  
Figure 4. Ideology of Concertación and Alianza Campaign Platforms, 
1989–2013 
 
Note:  Lines depict right ideology of the two major coalitions using the RILE index 
calculated based on presidential candidates’ campaign platforms collected and 
coded by the Comparative Manifestos project. The theoretical range of the in-
dex is -100 to 100 and is based on coding manifesto quasi-sentences into 76 
categories, including the 56 traditionally used in manifesto analysis of western 
Europe as well as 20 additional categories focused on the Latin American con-
text (Lehman et al. 2015). The 2005 estimate for Alianza is the score for 
Piñera (RN) who advanced to the second round.  
At the same time, each coalition’s programmatic identity has become 
more ambiguous as internal disputes have become more frequent and 
more public (Luna and Altman 2011: 17–19). Among the clearest exam-
ples of these eruptions of factionalism are independent presidential can-
didacies, such as those by former Partido Socialista members, Marco 
Enríquez-Ominami and Jorge Arrate; defections by congressional depu-
ties from the Partido Demócrata Cristiano to the right; and discord be-
tween and within the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and the 
Renovación Nacional (RN) over strategic and programmatic issues (Luna 
and Mardones 2010: 109–112; Luna 2014). Displays of factionalism and 
defections across old ideological battle lines often create uncertainty 
  44 Jana Morgan and Carlos Meléndez 
 
about parties’ or coalitions’ ideological commitments and obscure pro-
grammatic differences (Morgan 2011).  
Despite programmatic convergence and factionalism blurring the 
coalitions’ ideological identities, citizens and even experts continue to see 
the coalitions’ presidential candidates as ideologically distinct. Based on 
data from public opinion surveys conducted by the Centro de Estudios 
Públicos (CEP) and reported in table 2, Chileans have located Alianza 
candidates significantly to the right of Concertación nominees in the last 
two presidential elections. On a conventional left–right scale ranging 
from 1 (left) to 10 (right), the average placement for the Alianza nominee 
was 8.3 in 2009 (Sebastian Piñera) and 8.7 in 2013 (Evelyn Matthei) 
compared to 4.3 in 2009 (Eduardo Frei) and 3.6 in 2013 (Michelle Bach-
elet) for the Concertación nominee. Thus, legacies of left–right differentia-
tion continue to shape voters’ expectations of policy from the two coali-
tions even though their current policy positions no longer reflect much 
differentiation. Similarly, experts and elites have continued to see the 
Chilean parties as at least somewhat ideologically distinct.  
Table 2. Ideological Placement of Presidential Candidates, 2009 and 2013 
Year Candidate Political Party / Coalition Average Ideology  
2009 Sebastián Piñera UDI/Alianza 8.34 
 Eduardo Frei PDC/Concertación 4.27 
 Marco Enríquez-
Ominami Independent 4.49 
 Median voter  5.32 
 N=1505   
Year Candidate Political Party / Coalition Average Ideology  
2013 Evelyn Matthei UDI/Alianza 8.74 
 Michelle Bachelet PS/Nueva Mayoría 3.56 
 Marco Enríquez-
Ominami PRO 4.18 
 Median voter  5.02 
 N=1437   
Source:  Author calculations based on nationally representative surveys conducted by 
CEP. Ideology is measured on a 10-point scale; higher scores indicate more 
right-leaning positions. Differences between the Alianza and the Concertación 
are statistically significant in both years. 
Data from Duke University’s Democracy and Accountability Project and 
the Parliamentary Elites in Latin America survey identified a moderate 
degree of polarization between Chilean parties, as defined by experts and 
partisan politicians, respectively (Singer 2016 and authors’ calculations).12  
                                                 
12  We emphasize two important precautions concerning the relevance of these 
data sources for our purposes. First, these measures are calculated with refer-
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In the short term these increasingly unfounded perceptions of 
meaningful programmatic alternatives may permit stability. But in the 
medium term the declining relevance of the authoritarian–democracy 
divide and the fading differentiation on the more salient left–right axis 
threaten the major coalitions’ ability to secure support through pro-
grammatic differentiation. At the same time that programmatic differen-
tiation along the traditional left-right divide has declined, anti-establish-
ment appeals have gained a foothold among a significant proportion of 
the electorate. The fading ideological differentiation, the growing “social 
distance” between the elites and the mass public (Luna 2016), and recent 
corruption scandals involving the entire political class have nurtured 
anti-establishment sentiments that are coalesced around populist appeals 
that largely exist outside of political parties (Meléndez and Rovira 2016). 
The electorate seems to be divided between those who still support tra-
ditional parties’ candidates and those who are willing to opt for a new 
political offer. 
Thus, while Chile maintains a stellar reputation for its highly pro-
grammatic party system, the evidence here raises cause for concern. 
Administrations controlled by both coalitions have failed to respond 
effectively to their mandates on important valence issues, and program-
matic differentiation has faded, reducing the ideological options available 
to voters. Despite this rather bleak scenario concerning the status of 
programmatic representation, some evidence suggests that programmatic 
appeals have not vanished entirely. For instance, the Chilean electorate, 
which appears to favor programmatic appeals as their primary form of 
linkage, continues to perceive ideological differentiation and to vote in 
overwhelming majorities for the two major political coalitions; thus far, 
the two coalitions have adapted to the emergence of third-party forces 
by renewing their pacts. However, accomplishing programmatic repre-
sentation based on the tattered legacies of past successes in providing 
valence responsiveness or on the remaining shreds of programmatic 
differentiation places this form of linkage under significant strain. 
  
                                                                                                    
ence to individual parties, not the two coalitions that have dominated electoral 
options. The coalitions tend to close the ideological space between individual 
parties. Second, the surveys reflect the perceptions of experts and partisan poli-
ticians, not the policy options that are communicated to the electorate. For 
these reasons, we treat this information with less confidence than we do the 
manifesto data. 
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Fragile Interest Incorporation 
The Chilean party system also historically accomplished linkage via 
group-based incorporation strategies that reflected traditional class and 
religious divides. Before the 1973 coup, Chilean parties played a crucial 
role in organizing societal interests, thus forming the “backbone” of 
Chilean society (Garretón 1989). Incorporated groups included the capi-
talist classes (industry, finance, and agribusiness), represented by the 
right; religious interests, represented by the Christian Democrats and 
some elements of the right; the traditional middle class, represented by 
centrist parties; labor and urban popular sectors, represented by the 
Socialists and Communists; and rural peasants, represented by Christian 
democracy (Garretón 1989; Scully 1992). But under authoritarianism 
repression and neoliberalism severed many of the ties parties had main-
tained with urban and rural popular sectors and shifted the class struc-
ture, shrinking organized labor and commodifying the rural peasantry 
(Garretón 1989; Luna 2014). Moreover, as the negotiated democratic 
transition took shape, Christian Democrats and Socialists faced strong 
incentives to demobilize their social bases in order to facilitate and sus-
tain democratization (Oxhorn 1995; Posner 2004; Somma 2012: 297).  
As a result of these shifts in class structure and in the elite-con-
trolled political landscape, posttransition interest incorporation had be-
come less vibrant and encompassing than traditionally conceived (Luna 
and Altman 2011; Posner 1999). The capitalist classes and, to a lesser ex-
tent, religious interests remain effectively articulated by the Alianza and 
the Christian Democrats, respectively, whereas organized labor finds 
some incorporation through the left. However, unionization rates have 
declined and now stand at less than 15 percent (Dirección del Trabajo 
2014), meaning that many Chileans are located in the precarious or aspir-
ing middle class, which does not have access to effective group-based 
incorporation (see Barozet and Espinoza 2016). Moreover, neoliberalism 
removed targeted policy appeals like land reform from the political agen-
da and transformed the peasantry into unsettled seasonal laborers, result-
ing in the dismantling of associational networks that linked rural workers 
to left parties (Kurtz 2004). Partisan ties to the urban popular sectors 
were weakened under authoritarian rule and eviscerated through the 
transition process as leaders of the Concertación sought to preserve pacted 
democracy and prevent the kind of mobilization that had destabilized 
pre-Pinochet politics (Posner 1999, 2004). Thus, changes in the class 
structure together with the nature of Chile’s elite-negotiated democracy 
(which imposes serious constraints on any Concertación efforts to reinvig-
orate organizational ties to the base) has produced a pattern of group 
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incorporation that privileges upper-class concerns and is detached from 
and often seeks to demobilize significant sectors of society (Posner 
1999). Elites are responsible for securing the balance of power and hori-
zontal accountability, but they lack any organizational or institutional 
vehicles to connect with emerging social demands. This dynamic has 
consolidated a political system with no vertical accountability (Luna 
2016). 
In addition to increasingly marginalized urban and rural popular 
classes, indigenous communities and young people are also unlikely to 
find partisan expression of their interests. Traditional modes of incorpo-
ration and programmatic representation did not consider these groups, 
and party organizational strategies based on class cleavages are poorly 
aligned to articulate or integrate their concerns. These groups’ alienation 
is evidenced by low levels of participation in conventional political prac-
tices and their reliance on nonconventional forms of expression. As 
noted above, overall levels of abstention have increased markedly in 
Chile, but younger cohorts and indigenous communities have been par-
ticularly disengaged. Young people often opted out of the old electoral 
system, which placed obligatory voting requirements only on those who 
chose to register as voters. At the transition, one-third of those on the 
electoral registry were under 30 years old; however, by 2009 young peo-
ple accounted for only 10.9 percent of registered voters despite consti-
tuting 18 percent of the population (Contreras and Navia 2013: 427). 
Even after controlling for other factors, age remains significantly related 
to lower registration rates (Contreras and Navia 2013). These patterns, 
which have been noted as a sign of political disaffection (Luna and Alt-
man 2010), prompted reforms designed to reinvigorate turnout by estab-
lishing automatic registration and eliminating compulsory voting.  
However, since the reform implementation in 2012, participation 
rates have continued to decline (Barnes and Rangel 2014), and young 
people remain disproportionately unlikely to vote (Achtenberg 2014). 
Electoral participation among indigenous communities is also low. Aver-
age participation in the 10 comunas with the largest concentration of in-
digenous residents was significantly below the nationwide average in the 
2013 election. In some of these communities, particularly those in the 
north (i.e. Colchane, Camarones, and Ollague), effective participation 
rates are more than 20 percentage points below the national average. 
While the self-identified indigenous constitute no more than 10 percent 
of Chile’s population, their political marginalization is extreme. Since 
1924, only eight legislators have given descriptive voice to this popula-
tion, and successive democratic governments have failed to satisfy de-
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mands related to recognizing Mapuche territorial and political rights 
(Bidegain 2017).  
Table 3. Electoral Participation in Most Indigenous Comunas, 2013 (in %) 
Comuna Region Indigenous 
Population 
Electoral 
Participation 
Colchane  Tarapacá 78.1 21.7 
Camiña Tarapacá 75.1 50.7 
General Lagos Arica y Parinacota 62.0 76.5 
Camarones  Arica y Parinacota 61.6 27.2 
Ollague  Antofogasta 67.3 15.1 
San Pedro de 
Atacama Antofogasta 60.9 47.9 
Isla de Pascua Valparaíso 60.7 39.5 
Saavedra La Araucanía 64.3 46.9 
San Juan de la 
Costa Los Lagos 59.4 54.9 
Galvarino La Araucanía 59.2 52.2 
Average for 10 most indigenous comunas  43.3 
Average without General Lagos  39.6 
Nationwide   49.4 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from <www.servel.cl/>. Indigenous popu-
lation estimates from INE. 
Note:  Participation indicates share of eligible voters who cast effective ballots.  
The young and those in indigenous communities have increasingly ex-
pressed their frustration through protest. Social conflicts have emerged 
in relation to indigenous rights and student demands, with both groups 
questioning the dominant neoliberal model and their exclusion from 
institutional processes of incorporation (Somma 2012; Somma and 
Medel 2017). Indigenous communities and environmental activists have 
joined cause to oppose various development projects, including com-
mercial forestry, transportation infrastructure, hydroelectric dams, and 
mining – all of which threaten indigenous territories and degrade the 
environment (Aylwin 2000; Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009). Likewise, 
students have initiated two major protest waves, mobilizing some 20,000 
students in 2006 and 50,000–100,000 in 2011 (Palacios forthcoming; 
Somma 2012). Unlike the indigenous protestors, student demands pro-
voked some reaction from the traditional parties, with both major coali-
tions giving them some rhetorical attention (Somma and Medel 2017). 
However, despite some ties between the student movement and the left, 
the parties have been largely unwilling to enact substantive education 
reforms addressing student concerns, which has only intensified the 
divide between students and the establishment (Palacios forthcoming). 
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While a few student leaders have made successful forays into the elec-
toral arena, they have done so only at the margins of the traditional party 
system – none of the core parties from either coalition have integrated 
them into their ranks. Additionally, unlike the indigenous and environ-
mental movements, the student protesters represent a rapidly expanding 
segment of the population, and their demands capture issues of immedi-
ate relevance for numerous Chilean families who have had, currently 
have, or anticipate having children attend university (Somma 2012).13  
The resurgent waves of protest from sectors who find neither tar-
geted policy solutions addressing their demands nor organizational ties 
to parties reflect the underlying weaknesses of interest incorporation in 
the Chilean system. While failure to incorporate these interests will not 
inevitably lead to the immediate demise of the parties, their inability to 
integrate these movements points to a broader problem in which the 
dominant, more corporatist, class-based logic of interest integration 
fundamentally contradicts more pluralist logics that might facilitate in-
corporation for broader segments of society. As a result, the youngest 
cohorts and traditionally excluded ethnic groups are increasingly de-
tached from the formal mechanisms of representation. These social 
groups have not found meaningful representation among the traditional 
coalitions, and recent research has found that negative partisan identifi-
cation and anti-establishment identities are more prevalent among 18- to 
25-year-olds (Meléndez and Rovira 2016). Moreover, the parties’ elitist 
structures, which privilege demobilization and preservation of the status 
quo, are poorly equipped to channel pressures emanating from these 
marginalized groups (Luna 2014; Somma 2012). In its current form 
group-based incorporation is unlikely to provide much of a backstop to 
preserve linkage if programmatic appeals were to fail.  
Clientelism as Complement, Not Core  
Chile ranks among the Latin American countries with the lowest share of 
people who have been exposed to vote-buying attempts.14 In the 2014 
AmericasBarometer survey, only 3.6 percent of Chileans reported having 
personally received or observed an offer to exchange a vote for some 
material benefit, positioning Chile and Costa Rica as the countries with 
the lowest levels of vote-buying activity (Morgan and Espinal 2015: 208). 
                                                 
13  Between 1990 and 2010 tertiary education coverage expanded from 16 percent 
to 40 percent for the 18–24 age group (Somma 2012: 298). 
14  Although we use vote-buying as a proxy for the prevalence of clientelism, we 
are aware that other features of clientelism are present in Chile (e.g. patronage). 
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The country also scores low in expert surveys and other scholarly as-
sessments of clientelist efforts (Kitschelt and Altamirano 2015). Never-
theless, clientelism has helped generate stable linkage for some groups in 
Chilean politics. Historically, political machines forged enduring connec-
tions between the state and citizens, especially at the subnational level 
(Valenzuela 1977). Since the return to democracy, increasing social ine-
quality has motivated parties to deploy different types of electoral ap-
peals, combining programmatic and clientelist strategies to mobilize 
distinct constituencies (Luna 2014). For example, the UDI has used its 
access to private funding to exercise segmented, but nationally integrat-
ed, electoral strategies that involve clientelist exchanges targeted at its 
noncore constituencies (low-income) and programmatic appeals to its 
traditional following (conservative middle classes) (Luna 2014; Posner 
2004: 74). Thus, clientelism has been deployed to capture support from 
those whose interests are not reflected in the dominant programmatic 
debates or group-based appeals, such as the urban and rural poor (Kurtz 
2004; Luna 2014; Posner 2004). But clientelism is not the primary form 
of linkage for most Chileans, rendering it a complementary, not core, 
linkage strategy.  
Survey data collected after the 2009 general elections suggests vote-
buying in Chile reinforces established parties by concentrating resources 
among partisans.15 According to the data, 5.4 percent of Chileans have 
been involved in vote-buying activities, and this percentage is higher 
among party militants (8.2 percent) than nonmilitants (5.1 percent) and 
among strong partisan identifiers (7.6 percent) versus independents (5.2 
percent). This suggests that although clientelism in Chile is not wide-
spread, clientelist appeals have been developed through parties and rein-
force partisan attachments. 
Further qualitative and quantitative evidence similarly emphasizes 
how clientelist linkages have been employed by Chilean parties to foster 
their base (Arraigada 2013; Fuentes and de Cea forthcoming). Clien-
telism plays an effective role in connecting elites to their constituencies, 
facilitating control of social unrest, and providing a minimal form of 
linkage among otherwise excluded groups like ethnic minorities (Durston 
2009). Fuentes and de Cea (forthcoming) report the emergence of a new 
“professionalized strategy” in which political brokers play a more auton-
                                                 
15  A nationally representative survey was conducted in January 2010 as part of the 
Vote-Buying in the Americas project (by Ezequiel González-Ocantos, Chad 
Kiwiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, David Nickerson, and Javier Osori). Its 
questions focused on vote-buying activities, which we use as a proxy for clien-
telism. 
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omous role in comparison to traditional partisan clientelist methods. 
These new methods, however, do not weaken the centrality of parties as 
the dominant actors in the exchange (Durston 2009). Even antiparty or 
outsider rhetoric associated with emergent clientelist actors does not 
seem to affect mechanisms of reelection since clientelist competition 
occurs along partisan lines (Díaz et al. 2006).  
However, escalating demands for clientelist exchange places pres-
sure on this linkage strategy. When the population seeking material bene-
fits in exchange for their vote expands or makes regular conditional 
exchanges more expensive, parties encounter resource pressure to con-
tinue this practice. In Chile vote-buying is targeted in similar proportions 
across income levels. The percentage of people involved in this type of 
exchange is similar among the very poor (5.5 percent), poor (4.8 per-
cent), and middle/upper classes (5.8 percent) (Nickerson et al. 2013). 
The fact that middle-/upper-income households are targeted by clien-
telism together with the steady reduction of people in poverty (Minis-
terio de Desarrollo Social 2013) implies more expensive distributions. 
Moreover, if other linkage strategies decline, the parties may encounter 
increasing demands for clientelist exchanges as a substitute. Such pres-
sures could place new strains on clientelism, which would require addi-
tional resource investments through greater reliance on private funding 
(as reported in Luna 2014 and Posner 2005) or excessive manipulation of 
state resources. However, recent corruption scandals (e.g. Penta and 
SQM) involving party funding strategies may constrain the future of 
such practices. 
Conclusions: The Vulnerabilities of Chilean 
Linkage  
Our analysis suggests that the ongoing period of political upheaval and 
party system decay in Chile should not yet be catalogued as the complete 
bankruptcy of democratic representation, which would lead to the col-
lapse of the party system. However, there is considerable cause for con-
cern as evidence suggests there are certain vulnerabilities in the linkage 
profile, which the party system has thus far not moved to address. Effec-
tive valence policy responsiveness has decayed considerably during the 
last two governments, and poor approval ratings are increasingly associ-
ated with critiques of economic and public security policies. As the au-
thoritarian regime’s legacy fades, the old regime-based cleavage has lost 
much of its programmatic relevance. Moreover, a policy consensus 
around a modified version of neoliberalism has emerged since the transi-
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tion, producing ideological convergence between the two coalitions and 
constricting the set of programmatic options.  
In this context maintenance of programmatic linkage depends on 
effective valence responsiveness, which appears weak and vulnerable to 
serious crises that cannot be resolved through established policy-making 
strategies. Moreover, the escalation of existing divisions within the extant 
coalitions would further undermine the already-frayed programmatic 
structuration. Despite these programmatic shortcomings, the traditional 
parties and the two coalitions in which they compete continue to control 
most of the votes, managing to retain electoral support from a popula-
tion that overwhelmingly favors programmatic representation. 
As programmatic linkage loses status as the hallmark of the Chilean 
party system, pressure on other forms of linkage may intensify. Yet these 
linkage strategies presently seem ill-equipped to shoulder this burden. 
We have identified the fragility of interest incorporation, which primarily 
reinforces extant ideological divides without compensating for potential 
programmatic deficiencies. The parties have been unable to accommo-
date growing pressures from the younger cohort of voters who joined 
the voter rolls after the recent wave of electoral reforms. Younger voters 
did not experience the polarizing authoritarian era and face job markets 
that render them unemployed at rates nearly three times that of older 
adults (OECD 2015), which effectively excludes them from the em-
ployment structure upon which class-based appeals have traditionally 
been constructed. The younger cohort’s interests and ethnic minorities’ 
demands – although mobilized through street protests – have yet to be 
incorporated by the political establishment, which is primarily structured 
to integrate traditional class cleavages that lack salience among these 
groups. While incorporation could be expanded to these groups, doing 
so would likely require a shift toward a more pluralist system of interest 
articulation. Revising interest-based representation in this way would 
require considerable adaptation as it would mark a significant departure 
from the extant corporatist logic, which was set in place by the transition 
and continues to be incentivized by the elite-negotiated policy-making 
apparatus.  
Finally, while clientelism has served to reinforce other partisan link-
age strategies, such exchange-based ties appear to benefit only a small 
share of the population. Moreover, scaling up clientelism would require 
not only hefty resource investments but also significant restructuring of 
the parties’ current logic of segmented representation (Luna 2014), 
which seeks to conceal clientelist exchange. Such a process could open 
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the system up to further accusations of corruption and influence ped-
dling.  
Overall, the Chilean party system appears to be under stress. While 
we do not yet observe the complete bankruptcy of representation ob-
served in contexts of party system collapse, the system’s linkage portfolio 
is far from robust. Programmatic appeals have deteriorated and seem 
vulnerable to further decay, and alternative linkages through incorpora-
tion and clientelism are not encompassing enough to fill this potential 
void. Although programmatic rejuvenation is possible and the parties 
could expand interest incorporation and clientelism, significant organiza-
tional disincentives and resource obstacles make navigating these paths 
fraught with challenges. Moreover, the detection of sharp anti-establish-
ment sentiments among the youngest cohorts of the electorate compli-
cates the emergence of a pluralist intermediation system that integrates 
their concerns through system-based mechanisms. This divide suggests 
that existing parties have opened the door to significant shifts in the 
structure of the party system, either through the emergence of new par-
ties that provoke a realignment or through the collapse of the existing 
order. It is highly probable that during the next electoral cycle, the Chile-
an party system will continue to depend on the two traditional coalitions, 
but the gap between political representation and social demands will 
expand and deepen the pressure for change. 
Rather than exerting energy to resolve these representational short-
comings or reestablish connections with civil society, party elites have 
emphasized institutional reforms. Siavelis (2016) suggests that reforms 
focused on eliminating the elitist and disproportional facets of Chile’s 
institutional framework could open the system up to new competitors 
and promote more effective representation. Although we agree institu-
tional reform often has the potential to facilitate such goals, we are con-
cerned that the reforms in Chile have come too late and are too superfi-
cial to reconnect parties with Chile’s now-mobilized society. Institutional 
engineering often sets off a string of unintended consequences and cer-
tainly draws policy makers’ attention away from the concerns of ordinary 
citizens. Significant reform efforts have often been the last salvo from 
entrenched elites seeking to preserve the system through institutional 
adjustments rather than substantive change. Examples of institutional 
reforms accelerating rather than arresting linkage decay can be observed 
in many countries that have experienced party decay and in some that 
have undergone collapse, including Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, and 
Italy (Morgan forthcoming b). In Chile the reform process has intro-
duced a series of significant uncertainties for party elites, who are now 
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navigating new waters amid already fragile representational profiles. The 
anticorruption measures proposed by a presidential commission have 
not been applied completely, and the consultation process for a new 
constitution is still in its initial stages and it will not necessarily be con-
tinued by next administrations since its political momentum has weak-
ened. The energy that must be expended on adapting to new institutional 
incentives is immense, and the possibilities for miscalculations are high. 
These costs may prove too great for the existing party system to endure. 
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Partidos bajo presión: Empleando el marco del declive de vínculos 
políticos para analizar el sistema de partidos chileno 
Resumen: La impresión general que se tiene del sistema de partidos 
chileno lo caracteriza como altamente institucionalizado. Sin embargo, 
declives recientes en participación y en partidismo han empezado a cues-
tionar esta apariencia de estabilidad. Este artículo evalúa la actual situa-
ción del sistema de partidos chileno, analizando su capacidad para pro-
veer vínculos políticos. Especificamos un marco teórico para evaluar los 
tipos de vínculos políticos en el sistema chileno contemporáneo, enfati-
zando cómo su perfil de representación ha cambiado desde la transición 
democrática. El análisis sugiere que las dos coaliciones partidarias tradi-
cionales han dejado de ofrecer alternativas claras de políticas y que la 
representación programática depende crecientemente de la capacidad de 
respuesta a políticas públicas y de vestigios de antiguas divisiones ideoló-
gicas. Restricciones institucionales significativas coaccionan la capacidad 
partidaria de incorporar demandas de grupos sociales emergentes, mien-
  Parties under Stress 59
 

 
tras que las prácticas clientelares se mantienen como mecanismos com-
plementarios pero no como vínculos medulares. Esta evidencia señala 
que mientras la representación en Chile no se ha quebrado aún, el siste-
ma porta serias vulnerabilidades.16 
Palabras clave: América Latina, Chile, vínculos políticos, sistemas de 
partidos, representación, programático, clientelismo, incorporación de 
intereses 
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